Tag: Innovation

Why the Fallacy of Android-First

Dave Feldman wrote a very interesting post on TechCruch (“The Fallacy of Android-First”) where he details why the startup that he founded (Emu) launched Android-first, but after sixteen months, they reverted to iOS only.

There are many interesting points in this post. Here, I would like to categorize his findings and to draw a typical general picture of an innovative market leader and a follower frantically trying to catch up.

The allure of Android

Followers generally try to catch up with the combination of a) price and b) more features. With both more features and a price benefit, it seemly looks like the follower’s offering is better in all accounts. However, if you look under the hood, you often find that the features haven’t been well thought out and that they are actually quite useless.

In comparison, leaders usually focus on actual benefits. If they succeed, the leaders prevail and the market separates into low-end which becomes a price war, and the high-end which is rather stable. If leaders fail and are dragged into the price war, then the market loses the leader and everybody chases features that look good on paper, but are not beneficial to the user.

This is a common theme in many markets. It is also what is happening in mobile.

The Dave’s article, he mentions the allure of Android as the following;

  1. On Android, you can replace the built-in Messages app, while still using the underlying SMS/MMS medium, saving the effort of building a communication service.
  2. Android apps were supposedly easier to build.
  3. Fragmentation was supposedly becoming less of an issue.

The reality

The reality was that allure #1 was a feature that was not well implemented. It was so bad that it was close to unusable from a developer point of view.

  1. Android’s SMS APIs are not well documented. The APIs have also changed over time.
  2. Individual apps can block each other from receiving SMSes. This means that the presence of other apps affects whether your app works or not.
  3. Other issues with MMS make it a nightmare to support.

So the feature was there on Android, but it was very difficult to use in the real world.

There are also other issues described in the post and they basically say the same thing; Android has the features and support, but it’s often not very useful.

The lesson

The lesson is that features which the followers implement are rarely useful. You can’t trust them to have thought out all the issues. Although leaders will also fail sometimes, followers are much more likely to introduce useless features.

Thoughts on Mirrorless Cameras

Reuters had an article a month ago where they reported that sales of mirrorless cameras are “sputtering”.

This phenomenon is interesting for several reasons. Before we go into that, let’s look at what the article is saying;

Meanwhile, sales of mirrorless cameras – seen as a promising format between low-end compacts and high-end single-lens reflex (SLR) cameras – are sputtering as buyers put connectivity above picture quality.

Panasonic held 3.1 percent of the camera market in July-September, down from 3.8 percent a year earlier, according to IDC. Canon Inc, Nikon Corp and Sony Corp controlled over 60 percent between them.
“Only those who have a strong brand and are competitive on price will last – and only Canon, Nikon and Sony fulfil that criteria,” added Yoshida.

Mirrorless cameras such as Panasonic’s Lumix GM eliminate the internal mirrors that optical viewfinders depend on, so users compose images via electronic viewfinders or liquid crystal displays. This allows the camera to be smaller than an SLR, while offering better quality than compacts or smartphones due to larger sensors and interchangeable lenses.

From a high level, mirrorless cameras have the following characteristics;

  1. They are technically simpler than SLRs.
  2. They are smaller and more convenient than high-end SLRs.
  3. They are a middle category sitting between low-end compacts/smartphones and high-end SLRs.

In regards to the 3rd point, mirrorless cameras targeted a speculative market that was hoped to exist between the low-end and the high-end. In reality, that market did not exist or was much smaller than expected. Furthermore, due to technical advancements in sensor and processing technology, the low-end cameras became more sophisticated and more capable of taking good photos. Thus any middle market that did exist became narrower and narrower with time.

It is also interesting that Canon and Nikon seem to be relatively immune to the onslaught of smartphone cameras. This is simply because the high-end SLR market was never about convenience or taking simple snaps, but has been for a long time about taking really good pictures. Smartphones with their tiny lenses are severely limited by their optics and are not capable of taking artistic level photographs. You could say that the high-end is serving a very different market or that the jobs-to-be-done are very different from smartphones.

With this perspective, it is relatively straightforward to predict the future.

  1. For casual photos that most people want to post online, smartphones will evolve to be more than enough. As smartphone penetration increases, low-end cameras will continue to be squeezed out.
  2. Mirrorless cameras will find a niche for consumers who want something a little better than smartphone cameras. This niche however will shrink with time. Connecting mirrorless cameras to the Internet so that you can easily upload photos will shortly extend the life of this niche. However this feature alone cannot save this category because ultimately, the jobs-to-be-done is in direct competition with high-end smartphone cameras.
  3. High-end SLRs will continue to do just fine. Smartphones cannot touch this market due to optical limitations. The lower-cost SLRs may be more vulnerable. Connecting to the Internet may help sales, but a more desired feature is probably to effortlessly transfer photos to iPads etc.
  4. Price erosion may further happen in the low-end, but not in the high-end. Companies from Korea and China may try to enter the high-end but will easily fail. This is firstly because Nikon and Canon have a very high professional brand, and secondly because the expertise in optical mechanics is not something that the Korean and Chinese entrants are likely to possess. Korean and Chinese companies have high-level expertise in digital electronics and this allows them to compete in the low-end. However, without expertise in analog optical mechanics, you simply cannot create a good high-end SLR.

If it somehow becomes possible to take better pictures than a high-end SLR using a different technology, then it will become possible to disrupt the duopoly of Nikon and Canon on the high-end. That is after all, how Nikon and Canon disrupted the German camera makers which had been using range-finder optics (Leica, Contax, etc.) with the then new SLR technology in the mid 20th century.

Could Cloud Computing be Commoditized?

There is a common conception that hardware and software will eventually be commoditized and all significant computing will move to the cloud. This trend will supposedly result in the hardware companies like DELL, HP and even Apple finding themselves selling commodities with little or no profit. Likewise, software will also be commoditized so that software companies like Microsoft will find their profits eroded.

Google has strongly pursued this strategy. Besides search and advertising, Google has consistently tried to commoditize software. They started by basically copying MS-Office with Google Docs and providing it for free. The aim was to make all computing happen inside a web browser, so that Google could place Ads. This was again the strategy for Android. They wanted to commoditize mobile operating systems so that any hardware manufacturer could easily enter the market, driving down prices. By commoditizing the OS, they assumed hardware commoditization would follow.

Their are many issues with this argument.

One is the assumption that the Cloud is harder to commoditize than hardware or software.

This is definitely true for search. Microsoft and Yahoo have tried to compete with Google in search, and have found it very difficult.

However, there is little evidence that the Cloud is harder to commoditize for web applications like Google Docs. These web applications are basically applications, hence the same market and technology dynamics affect how the market progresses. For example, OwnCloud provides an open-source implementation of DropBox that you can run on your own servers.

I think that the idea that commoditization linearly progresses from hardware to software to services (the Cloud) is a huge oversimplification, and that in reality, there are many case where this does not fit. Reality is probably that any market in which any significant innovation occurs will become de-commoditized. Likewise any market, including the Cloud, will be commoditized when real innovation is lacking.

Whether or not the Cloud will eventually be commoditized depends on whether the Cloud allows a pace of innovation that cannot be matched by hardware or software. If Cloud computing allows companies to make significant innovations much faster, then it will escape commoditization.

I don’t think that this is the case at all.

Low-end does not equal Low-end Disruption

Clayton Christensen outlines several rules as a litmus test to check whether certain strategies qualify as low-end disruptions. These are described together with some examples in his book “The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth”, which is viewable on Google Books (although I highly recommend purchasing the book).

Although many people are aware that low-end disruptions can occur when the performance of the current technology is overshooting the mainstream, that is hardly sufficient. There are several more important tests which are just as important, but are often left out.

Here I want to review those which I think are critical.

  1. If it is to be a low-end disruption, customers in the low-end of the current market must be over-served.
  2. The disruptor must be able to earn attractive returns at the low-end prices.
  3. If it is to be a new-market disruption, it has to compete against non-consumption. That means that a large untapped market exists which can be targeted with the new product.
  4. The disruption must be so that the incumbents are motivated to flee upmarket.

In my discussion on Chromebooks, I argue that Chromebooks cannot be a low-end disruption nor new-market disruption;

  1. Low-end Wintel laptops are virtually identical hardware-wise to Chromebooks except for storage (HD vs. SSD). The firms that produce the hardware are also the same. Hence Chromebooks do not allow attractive returns compared to Wintel (price differences simply reflect the OS price). Additionally, price wars have already begun making profits elusive.
  2. The price difference or simplicity difference of Chromebooks compared to Wintel is not very significant. Certainly not significant enough to tap non-consumption, except in the most price-conscious markets.
  3. Microsoft has traditionally aggressively pursued the low-end. Intel similarly targets the low-end with Atom and Celeron. It is unlikely that they will be motivated to flee upmarket.

In my discussion of Windows phone, I argue that Windows phone could be a low-end/new-market disruption because apparently Windows phone can run better on low-end hardware compared to Android, thus giving Windows phone the possibility to earn attractive returns at lower prices.

Android 4.4 KitKat has been reengineered to work better on low-spec phones to address this vulnerability, but until Samsung comes out with a low-end KitKat phone, low-end Windows phones will continue to thrive. The success of Windows phone largely rests on whether or not Google has really managed to get KitKat to work well on low-end phones. Given that Android up till now has always required more resources than iOS, even with Googles technical prowess, I don’t really know the answer.

Additionally, looking at MS-Office vs. Google Docs, it is evident that Google Docs is trying to be a low-end disruptor. The issue is that MS-Office is very much a standard file-format, and hence even low-end users require MS-Office. Unless the user is technically skilled enough to be comfortable with fixing format incompatibilities, they will take the safe route which is staying with MS-Office. The issue is not whether the low-end of the current market is over-served by MS-Office features. Instead, we should look at file-format compatibility. 100% file-format compatibility is something that most corporate customers require, and it is hence not over-serving in any way.

It is important to note that Microsoft is willing to bundle MS-Office at a low price for Windows 8. They really don’t like giving up the low-end.

To summarize, I have described why I think that a lot of the potential low-end disruptions that are being discussed on the web simply do not pass the litmus-test as described by Clayton Christensen. Windows phone might have a chance, not because Google is fleeing upmarket, but because it might take too much time until Android KitKat is ready for low-end phones.

On the Future of MS-Office, or Actually How MS-Office Affects the Future

There’s was this interesting conversation on the future of MS-Office on Twitter, and Umang Jaipuria collected the tweets to make a very interesting read.

Matt Rosoff also wrote an informative article inspired by this discussion “Why Microsoft Office can’t be uprooted so easily”.

This is also something that I have been thinking about and I just want to add a few comments to clarify my thoughts.

Bendict Evans:

The future & importance of MS Office is a key to understanding a lot of the next few years. Often seems like a blind spot in the Valley

Bendict Evans:

Hence my original tweet: the way Office evolves or its use cases get reimagined is a big trend, which also affects tablets & PCs

This is a very important point which unfortunately seems to have been lost as the discussion turned into an MS-Office vs. Google Docs argument. What I think Ben Evans meant to say is that if MS-Office remains as important and relevant as it currently is, then the platforms that work well with it will be at a strong advantage.

I understand this to mean that what Microsoft chooses to do, and actually manages to implement with MS-Office, will strongly affect which platforms will win in the tablet market, and the extent to which laptops will be replaced by tablets.

Marc Andreessen

Plus Google Docs and its peers way better for online collaboration–automatic, seamless, all devices/OSs — new requirement.

Benedict Evans

Shared doc editing is a feature and not a universal core case. And isn’t a collaboration platform a better approach?

Here Marc Andreessen argues that the collaboration features of Google Docs are the core appeal. Benedict Evans on the other hand disagrees.

If I understand correctly, Benedict Evans views Google Docs as an inferior replacement for MS-Office whereas Marc Andreessen thinks that Google Docs is a collaboration platform more akin to a Wiki.

My opinion leans towards Benedict Evans. For one thing, the design of Google Docs simply resembles a folder with some Word, Excel or Powerpoint documents. Even the icon colors try to associate themselves with the color-coding for MS-Office; blue for a word processor, green for a spreadsheet, and orange for presentations. Inside the app, the user-interface strongly resembles pre-ribbon MS-Office interfaces. There are a couple of buttons for collaboration features, but that’s it. The design suggests that sharing is an addition to the core case (low-cost imitation of MS-Office) and not the other way around.

What this means is that Google Docs is probably targeted towards users who primarily want to edit a document.

Benedict Evans:

Excel is a platform. And an IDE

Benedict Evans:

Office is very feature rich but task-agnostic (Lawyers & admen use same apps). SAAS tends to be the other way around?

Chris Dixon:

yes, SaaS tends to be focused on jobs to be done. Part of is it “bottoms up” (division level) sales model.

Marc Andreessen

And it seems that because of that SAAS will end up being much bigger/diverse than we all thought 5-10 yrs ago.

There is good agreement here in what MS-Office is, and what the new SaaS products that Marc Andreessen and others foresee will replace it are.

Marc Andreessen appears to think that SaaS will diversify and evolve to the point where, for most custom solutions that can be imagined in Excel, there will be a SaaS solution for it. I find this hard to believe.

Whenever we adopt a SaaS solution, we are forced to adjust to it. There is very rarely a pre-configured product that fits what we need to do exactly. In addition to a learning curve, there is an adoption curve where we change our workflow to fit better with the fixed SaaS solution. What’s more troublesome is that we don’t really know before we embark on our learning, whether or not the fit will be good. Unless the application requires a lot of collaboration and simultaneous access, forgoing a SaaS and instead creating a simple solution in Excel is often by far the quickest and the most effective.

My view

Google Docs is an attempt to commoditize MS-Office. It imitated the design and functionality of MS-Office and is offered free-of-charge to maximize adoption. However, MS-Office is still very much the standard in corporate and professional environments.

Importantly, MS-Office is not just content-creation software. It is often used as viewing software. It is the equivalent of Adobe Illustrator, Adobe InDesign and Adobe Acrobat for the creator, but also the equivalent of Adobe Acrobat Viewer for the reader. The availability of MS-Office does not only affect the content-creation side, but is essential for the consumption side as well.

As Benedict Evans states, the evolution of MS-Office and how corporations use software will greatly affect tablets & PCs. This is a very strong card that Microsoft still holds, and which can sway the game to its favor. Its strength is very often underestimated.

There are a lot of unknowns and also technical obstacles.

Apple recently introduced new versions of its programs in the iWorks suite. The reviews were not pretty. In order to bring file-format and user-interface parity between the iOS versions and the Mac versions, many features of the Mac version were at least temporarily removed. Given that the PC versions of MS-Office have much more features than iWorks ever did, achieving file-format and feature parity between mobile and PC versions of MS-Office is likely to remain a huge challenge for many more years. However, Atom-based Windows tablets running regular Windows 8 will have no problem running the PC version of MS-Office, although the UI may be awkward.

It will be interesting to see how Microsoft plays its cards.

Why the Chromebook is not a Low-End Disruption

Do Chromebooks fill the criteria for a low-end disruption? Can we expect the Chromebooks to eventually move upmarket and disrupt the PC industry? Since we have seen Chromebooks make some success in some markets, these are valid questions to ask.

First of all, there is no denying that Chromebooks are low-end. They are typically priced lower than Windows laptops (although the price difference is not very large), and the cheaper Chromebooks have lower specs. However, low-price alone does not qualify a product as a low-end disruption.

Let’s look at a few more attributes that we should find in a product that causes low-end disruption.

Is the current market overshooting?

In terms of performance, Chromebooks and low-end Wintel laptops both use Intel Celeron processors. There are some exceptions that use an ARM, but these are mostly coming from Samsung which makes their own ARM-based CPUs. They also have 2GB of RAM which is the same as a low-end Windows laptop. The main difference seems to be whether they use a HD with hundreds of Gigabytes of storage, or whether they use a fast SSD with only tens of Gigabytes of storage. Storage seems to be the only area where Chromebooks can skimp on hardware relative to Wintel machines.

Given that the hardware specifications of a Chromebook and a low-end Wintel laptop are almost identical, it is hard to argue that the Chromebooks are targeting a market that is over-served by Wintel. You could argue that Chromebooks are faster than Wintel due to the use of SSD, and that probably is very true. This would however suggest that Chromebooks are “sustaining innovations” relative to Wintel that are playing in the low-end market segment.

Is the price differential large enough to attract new customers?

Although the cost for an OEM to install Windows on a computer is confidential, it is probably not large enough to make a free operating system like Chrome OS a game changer. For example, the cheapest Chromebook on Amazon.com is the Acer C720 for $199 with a Intel Celeron 2955U 1.4 GHz CPU and 2GB of RAM. On the Windows side, you can get an ASUS 1015E laptop with an Intel Celeron 847 1.1 GHz CPU and 2GB of RAM for $299 or a ASUS VivoBook X200CA with an Intel Celeron 1007U 1.5GHz CPU and 2GB of RAM for $300.

The price difference of $100 is substantial at this low price, but it is not large enough to expand the market. I doubt that people willing to pay $200 will find $300 abominable. Hence people looking at Chromebooks will also be interested in Windows. Chromebooks are not creating a new market for consumers who couldn’t previously afford a laptop. They are simply marketed to the same customers as a cheaper alternative.

Therefore Chromebooks are not competing with non-consumption. Instead they are competing head-on with the incumbent, and that is always difficult.

Is the simplicity enough to attract new customers?

Some people argue that Chromebooks are much simpler than Wintel computers or Macs. That may or may not be the case, depending on the tasks that you need to get done. This is not however the question that should be asked.

What needs to be addressed is whether or not the increased simplicity is enough to target non-consumption. In other words, will those people who previously did not buy laptops due to the complexity, buy Chromebooks by virtue of the improved simplicity. Will the increased simplicity create a new market which Chromebooks can uniquely target?

That was certainly the case for the iPad. Small children and seniors are very comfortable with the iPad. Significant numbers of people who didn’t use personal computers before can now use iPads because of the much improved simplicity.

Now, is this the case with Chromebooks? I strongly doubt it.

What are the jobs-to-be-done?

When you compare the jobs-to-be-done of Chromebooks and Wintel laptops, Chromebooks are simply a subset.

Both require you to be sitting at your desk or at least have your computer on your lap. This is very different from iPads and smartphones which can be used comfortably even when you are standing up, lying down or reclining on the sofa. Hence Chromebooks will be used when you are at work or studying. Not when you are relaxing or only have a couple of minutes of free time. They won’t be used much for reading e-books, watching videos, etc. You can easily see that the usage scenarios for Chromebooks completely overlap with Wintel laptops.

Hence Chromebooks are competing directly with Wintel for the same jobs-to-be-done. Here again, they are fighting the incumbent head on.

Summary

In summary, Chromebooks are unlikely to succeed as a low-end disruption because they are competing head on against the incumbent in almost every way. Although the incumbent (Wintel) is weakened compared to its heyday, they successfully deflected the Netbook-Linux threat and are still formidable competitors. Wintel has also always addressed the low-end, and has never fled up-market. Chromebooks are not significantly more low-end than the market Wintel is already competing in so we can expect Wintel to quickly address any threats. I find it unlikely that Chromebooks are enough to disrupt.

iPads vs. Chromebooks Illustrates how Apple and Google are Different

There is a lot of talk on the web about how successful the Chromebooks are starting to be (or if they are successful at all). I have discussed this at length in this blog (although mainly in Japanese), and my conclusion as of now is that success is limited to education. As Ben Bajarin informed me via Twitter, most Chromebooks are being used as digital textbooks, so to speak.

Searching the web, the main allure of Chromebooks in an educational environment seem to be;

  1. Price of device.
  2. Ease of administration.
  3. Availability of a keyboard (compared to iPads).

In other metrics like the number of educational applications, Chromebooks fall behind Windows.

Given the above situation, the innovation in Chromebooks can be summarized as follows;

  1. Chromebooks are an “efficiency” innovation. They aim to reduce the price of personal computers (including cost of administration) in education.
  2. Chromebooks are targeting the “low-end”, trading off features for price. The assumption is that the capability of current day computers are overshooting educational requirements and that Chromebooks are “good-enough”. Whether Chromebooks can succeed as a “low-end disruption” is dependent on whether this assumption is true.

This approach is very similar to how Google approached office software suites with Google Docs and even Android.

In both cases, Google has simply done the following;

  1. Imitate the incumbent.
  2. Reduce the price.

Chromebooks are simply normal laptops with a browser focus. Removal of baggage has improved the experience for some tasks, but for the most part, Chromebooks are just another laptop. They are hardly the re-think of computing that iPads were.

Google Docs is essentially an underpowered Office suite. The user interface closely mimics MS-Office but a lot of the features aren’t there. There are also some collaborative features which are an improvement on what MS-Office already provided, but the main appeal is indisputably the price.

Contrast this to what iPads have enabled in education. There are many examples, but I will refer to an article that I came by this morning which discusses the many hurdles for adopting technology in the classroom (which clearly shows that computers in education are hardly “good enough”), but also illustrates the benefits.

iPads in the classroom: Not a bust, but not yet a boon

In the meantime, Cisneros notices how iPads help students new to the English language open up. She listened to a recording they did as they told stories about illustrations that were uploaded to their tablets.

“These students never speak in class,” Cisneros says. “But I hear them in the recording, telling these stories and providing all these elaborate details.”

Cisneros also uses the iPad to transport them to different places. Recently, she arranged for her students to meet first-graders in a special education class at Esplanade Elementary in Orange, Calif., via the iPad. One student used Braille to read a story to Cisneros’ class.

“My students were mesmerized, watching her hands move over the pages,” Cisneros said. “I got chills.”

This is “empowering” innovation.

Google’s hope is that by imitating current technology and making it free, more people will use it. The assumption is that price is the major barrier. They overcome this barrier by either subsidizing the price with their profits from the search business, or apply “efficiency” innovations.

Apple’s approach is that price is not the major barrier. They assume the barrier is simplicity. To overcome this barrier, they rethink and remake the product to make it simple. This result is an “empowering” innovation.

If Google had existed around the time Apple created the Apple I, I imagine Google would have worked to reduce its price by sacrificing margins. Their target would be hardware hobbyists who were short of money. What Apple did was to create the Apple II, thereby empowering people whom were not hardware hobbyists to experience personal computing.

良いイノベーションと悪いイノベーション

「イノベーション」という言葉は日本だけでなく、海外でも乱用されています。人によって意味が違いますし、自社を格好良く見せるために意味もなく「イノベーション」という言葉が使われています。

「イノベーションのジレンマ」で有名なClayton Christensen氏はさすがに「イノベーション」という言葉をそのまま使わず、明確に定義して使っています。

イノベーションが経済に与える効果

イノベーションは経済にとってプラスであるというのが一般的な考え方です。しかしChristensen氏は経済にとってプラスになるイノベーションとマイナスになるイノベーション、そして効果のないイノベーションがあるとしています。

特に近年の傾向として、経済にマイナスなイノベーションにばかり資本が流入していることを危惧しています。

  1. “empowering innovations”
    複雑で高価だったため一部の人しか使えなかった製品を、多くの人が使えるシンプルで安価なものに変えていくイノベーション。”empowering innovation”は製造･流通とアフターケアの仕事を生み出し、経済に対してプラスの効果があります。
  2. “sustaining innovations”
    旧型の製品を置き換えるイノベーション。例えばプリウスは既存の製品を置き換えるだけなのでこのタイプのイノベーション。経済に対してはzero-sumであり、効果がありません。
  3. “efficiency innovations”
    既存製品の製造･流通およびアフターケアに関わる仕事を減らしていくイノベーションです。トヨタ自動車のジャスト･イン･タイムの製造方法はこのタイプです。経済に対しては就職口を減らす効果があり、経済に対してマイナスの効果があります。

参考：“Christensen: We are living the capitalist’s dilemma”

イノベーションと市場の下克上

Christensen氏が「イノベーションのジレンマ」で取り上げたのは、市場のおける下克上でした。そのときはイノベーションを以下のように分けました。

  1. “disruptive innovations”
    非常に高価だったり、高いスキルがないと使いこなせかった製品を変革させ、全く新しい顧客層を開拓するイノベーション。多くの場合、市場に下克上をもたらします。”empowering innovations”を共通するところが多い。
  2. “sustaining innovations”
    現状の顧客の要望に合わせ、より良い製品を作っていくイノベーション。多くの場合は市場に下克上は起こりません。

参考：www.claytonchristensen.com

この視点でいろいろなイノベーションを評価してみる

あくまでも例題として、Steve Wildstrom氏が書いた“Eight Innovators That Shook the World”を取り上げて、ここに取り上げたイノベーションはそれぞれどのように分類されるかを評価してみたいと思います。ただし私自身が理解していない事例は外します。

Apple

  1. Apple II:
    Apple IIでけではないのですが、当時のパーソナルコンピュータの役割は、自分で電子回路を組み立てられる趣味人のおもちゃだったパーソナルコンピュータを使いやすく作り替え、普通の人にも使えるようにしたことです。また高価なメインフレームがなければできなかった計算処理を、一般人が購入できるハードウェアで実現しました。その意味ではまさに”empowering innovation”です。
  2. Mac:
    Macのインパクトはいろいろあります。Aldus PagemakerとLaserWriterとのコンビネーションでDTPという市場を作り上げたこと、Adobe PhotoshopやAdobe Illustratorとともにデジタルデザインの市場を作り上げたことなどはもちろんそうです。私は大学の研究室で学生をしていましたが、Macのおかげでプレゼンテーション資料などの作成が大幅に簡略化され、品質が向上しました。他にも例は数えきれませんが、まさに”empowering”でした。Windows 95はMacのすばらしさをより多くに人に提供したという意味で”empowering”でした。
  3. iPhone:
    実はChristensen氏はiPhoneが登場した当初はこれを”sustaining innovation”と考え、iPhoneは成功しないと考えていました。iPhoneとNokiaのスマートフォンを比較し、iPhoneはNokiaスマートフォンを改良した”sustaining innovation”でしかないと考えたのです。今ではChristensen氏が何を間違えたかは明白です。iPhoneをNokiaと比べるのではなく、パーソナルコンピュータと比較するべきだったのです。机の上に置いて使うパーソナルコンピュータを大幅に簡略化し、小型化により使えるシチュエーションを大幅に増やしました。インターネットをどこからでもすぐに利用できることで、大きな”empowerment”がありました。特にiPadになると、タッチUIの使いやすさが大きな”empowerment”をもたらします。いままでコンピュータを利用しなかったような小さい子供や年寄りでも使えるようになったからです。

Google

  1. Web検索:
    Google以前にもWeb検索をAltavistaなどが提供しており、これらに対してはGoogleは”sustaining innovation”でした。ただWeb検索全体を取ってみるとこれはまさしく”empowering innovation”であり、情報の入手のしやすさは飛躍的に向上しました。
  2. Google Maps:
    この場合も決してGoogleがイノベーションのきっかけを作ったわけではありませんが、iPhoneの登場以来、携帯電話で地図を利用するのは一般的になりました。携帯電話での地図利用についてはカーナビゲーションシステムは以前からあり、普及していましたので、社内での利用に関しては”sustaining”です。また電車の乗り換えについてもGoogleよりも良いものが以前からありましたので、よく言っても”sustaining”でしょう。したがってGoogle Mapsのみならず、携帯での地図利用は”sustaining”だと言えます。

Amazon

  1. インターネットでの小売り
    Amazonの小売りにおけるイノベーションはかなりの部分”efficiency innovation”です。ウェブを使うことで店舗の必要性を無くし、また物流の改善も可能でした。その結果、安価で製品を販売することが可能になりました。しかしAmazonで売り上げが増えた分はそくり既存の店舗の売り上げ減です。店舗縮小で従業員も少なくなりました。Amazonの登場で本を読む人が増えたとか、読書にかける金額が増えたということはなく、zero-sum以下のminus-sumです。
  2. 電子書籍
    電子書籍も同じです。書籍の電子化によって流通が簡単になりました。しかしそれによって新しいタイプの本が増えたということはほとんどなく、読書量が増えたということもないでしょう。したがって経済にマイナスの効果がある”efficiency innovation”です。これはAppleがiBooks Authorでやろうとしていることと区別しなければなりません。Appleは既存の書籍では実現できなかったインタラクティブなマルチメディア体験を教科書に取り入れることで、子供の学習効率が上がり、成績が上がることを期待しています。したがってiBooks Authorは成功すれば”empowering”です。しかし現在のAmazon Kindleは、印刷された書籍をそのまま電子化するだけのものですので、”empowering”効果がありません。単に紙媒体に変わるだけです。
  3. Amazon Web Services
    Amazon Web Servicesは”empowering”です。データセンターを運営することは多額の初期投資が必要で、専門的な知識も必要でした。しかしAWSのおかげでそんなことを考えずに起業することが可能になり、多数のスタートアップが生まれました。まさに”empowering innovation”です。

Microsoft

Microsoftによる”empowering innovation”は疑う余地がありません。AppleがMacでGUIなどを成功させましたが、製品が効果でした。MicrosoftはGUIが動く安価なパソコンが普及する原動力をWindows 95によってもたらし、Macのような高価な製品が買えない人にまでパソコンを普及させました。Windows 95のおかげでハードウェアの市場は活気を帯び、ソフトウェア産業も大きく膨らみました。インターネットの利用が増え、インターネットが産業として成功したのもWindows 95なくしては語れません。

Windows 95は多くの部分でMacを真似たものではあります。しかしMacだけではここまでパーソナルコンピュータとインターネットを普及させることはできなかったでしょう。

アベノミックスの経済成長戦略を考える

上記のイノベーションの考え方に基づいて、アベノミクスの経済成長戦略を振り返ります。本当に経済成長につながるのか、それとも逆に経済を縮小させるものなのかを考えてみたいと思います。

主に考えるのは規制緩和策です。例えば「医薬品のネット販売解禁」などが好例です。

医薬品のネット販売というのはどういうタイプのイノベーションでしょうか？

  1. 今までの医薬品販売は複雑だったでしょうか？高価だったでしょうか？新しい需要の創出が可能でしょうか？おそらくはそのどれも当てはまりません。したがって”empowering”とは言えません。
  2. ネット販売のよってよりよいサービスが実現できるでしょうか？一部ドラッグストアが遠い人にとっては便利になりますが、その影響は小さいと考えられます。したがって若干”sustaining”の要素はありますが、さほど大きくはありません。
  3. ネット販売によって物理的な店舗の需要が減り、従業員数が減るでしょうか？これはまさしくそうなるでしょう。したがって”efficiency innovation”の側面が大きいのは間違いありません。

そう考えると「医薬品のネット販売解禁」は成長戦略どころか、成長を阻害する戦略とも言えます。別途大きな付加価値がない限り、オンライン小売りはどれをとっても成長を促すことはありません。

アベノミクスの他の具体的な規制緩和策はこれから見えてくるのでしょうが、規制緩和をすれば必ず経済成長を促すわけでもないし、イノベーションを促進するものが経済成長を促進するとも限りません。

特に気をつけなければならないのは、既存の大企業は”sustaining innovation”と”efficiency innovation”に傾きやすい点です。ましてや大企業が既存ビジネスに投資している限りはまず”sustaining”か”efficiency”です。

そういうことを国家がサポートしても経済成長は生まれません。

Androidのフラグメンテーション

Chris Lacy氏がAndroidのフラグメンテーションについてGoogle+で語っています。

要点は以下の通り；

  1. フラグメンテーションは無い方が良い。
  2. しかし、フラグメンテーションを受け入れる代わりに、柔軟性と自由と巨大なシェアを獲得できたのである。
  3. 柔軟性と自由と巨大なシェアに比べれば、フラグメンテーションは大きな問題ではない。
  4. 実際、ウェブはめちゃくちゃにフラグメンテーションしている。しかしすごく広がっているし、発展している。

Chris Lacy氏のコメントはもっともです。

ただし一つだけ制限があります。

フラグメンテーションが問題になるのは、最先端のぎりぎりのすごいことをやるときです。例えばウェブで言えば、ブラウザサポートが不十分な最先端のHTML5, CSS3を使うときはフラグメンテーションが大きな問題になります。一方でInternet Explorer 8でもサポートしているような普通のHTMLとCSSだけを使うのであれば、フラグメンテーションは問題になりません。

また細部にこだわったデザインを行うときもしかりです。ウェブで言えば、デザイン性に非常にこだわったウェブサイトは固定幅でデザインされていることが多く、レスポンシブ・ウェブ・デザインはしていません。ブラウザウィンドウのサイズそのものは変更できませんが、ページの大きさそのものを固定して、レイアウトが崩れないようにしています。

実際のどれだけの開発者がここまでこだわったアプリ作りやウェブサイト作りをしているかはわかりませんが、Appleの方針はこだわる人をサポートすることです。可能な限り最高のアプリケーションを開発しようという人、iOSデバイスの新しい可能性をとことん追求しようという人をサポートすることです。理由は簡単です。

Because the ones that are crazy enough to think they can change the world, are the ones who do.

もっと具体的にいえば、Appleが大切にしたい開発者というのは、iOSの限界にチャレンジし、圧倒的に優れたアプリをiOSのためだけに開発し、iOSプラットフォームの差別化に寄与してくれる人たちです。ですから彼らの挑戦をAppleは大切にしています。

普通の開発者にとってはフラグメンテーションは問題にならないかも知れませんが、こだわりのある開発者にとっては問題になるのです。

Steve BallmerとInnovator’s Dilemmaをはっきりさせる

Horace Dediu氏が“Steve Ballmer and The Innovator’s Curse”という題で、Innovator’s Dilemmaの視点からSteve Ballmerを擁護しています。

具体的には、既存の製品からの利益を最大化する経営戦略、つまり経営者に通常期待される戦略そのものがMicrosoftをInnovator’s Dilemmaに陥れたということです。したがってもしもSteve BallmerがInnovator’s Dilemmaを避けるようなことをしたならば、むしろその方が早くクビにされたのではないかと述べています。

Clayton Christensen氏のInnovator’s Dilemma理論を深く理解していないと得られない視点です。一般的な考え方と逆なので。

Horace Dediu氏は抽象的に議論していますが、私なりに具体的に考えたいと思います。

Microsoft ascended because it disrupted an incumbent (or two) and is descending because it’s being disrupted by an entrant (or two). The Innovator’s Dilemma is very clear on the causes of failure: To succeed with a new business model, Microsoft would have had to destroy (by competition) its core business. Doing that would, of course, have gotten Ballmer fired even faster.

まずはMicrosoftがトップに躍り出たのは、既存の企業を破壊的イノベーションで押しやったからだとしています。この場合、「既存の企業」というのはIBMを指し、破壊的イノベーションというのは「パーソナルコンピュータ」を指すでしょう。個人用のパソコンを所有することが現実的となるぐらいに、そして普通の個人がパソコンを操作できるぐらいに簡単にしたのはMicrosoftです（アップルは操作は簡単にしましたが、値段を下げなかったので不十分でした）。これでIBMのオフィスコンピュータ、メインフレームのビジネスを破壊しました。

Microsoftが特にパソコンの値段を下げるのに成功したのは、ハードウェアをコモディティーにしたからです。ソフトウェアを広く供給し、普及させることで、パソコンメーカーは差別化ポイントを失います。そしてハードウェアの価格競争に巻き込まれます。

一方Googleはソフトウェアをコモディティーにする戦略を立てています。Cloudを利用することでソフトウェアに広告を配信するビジネスモデルを確立し（まだ収益の柱ではありませんが）、ソフトウェアを無償で利用できるようにしています。MicrosoftがGoogleのビジネスモデルを追従しようと思うと、今までのソフトウェアでの収益を犠牲にする必要があります。普通の経営者であればこの選択はしません。

またiPhoneが登場した背景には、最先端のハードウェアと優れたソフトウェアを組み合わせたことがあります。Microsoftはソフトウェアを広く供給することがビジネスモデルですので、最先端のハードウェアじゃなくても動作するソフトを供給しようとします。幅広いハードをサポートするようにします。したがって時代を先取りしたハードを必要とする製品はなかなか開発できません。特定のハードウェアメーカーをひいきして、密に組んで革新的なハードを開発するのはなかなかできません。Microsoftは早い段階からモバイルに着目していましたが、斬新なハードを作るのはビジネスモデルに合わず、Palmのそっくりさんの作る方がビジネスモデルに合っていました。

Tablet PCについては、Microsoftはパソコンの存在を脅かすものを作るのではなく、パソコンの進化形を作ろうとしていました。ですから、パソコンプラスアルファをデザインしていました。当然値段もパソコンより高くなります。一方、Appleは引き算でiPadをデザインしました。パソコンからマルチタスク、マルチウィンドウを取り除き、キーボードを外しました。Flashを外したのはむしろかわいい方です。引き算と引き替えに、低価格、長持ちする電池、簡単な操作性を手に入れました。iPadだとデバイスの単価は下がりますので、Microsoftの利益は減る可能性があります（Netbookの時と同じように）。Tablet PCにしていけば、利益は変わりません。

If anything, Steve Ballmer avoided The Innovator’s Curse. Being successful with new market innovations would probably have led to an even shorter tenure. Destroying prematurely the pipeline of Windows in favor for a profit-free mobile future would have been a fireable offense. Where established large companies are concerned, markets punish disruptors and reward sustainers.

MicrosoftはWindowsとOfficeが収益の柱です。MicrosoftにとってのCloud戦略にしてもMobile戦略にしても、あくまでもWindows/Officeの売り上げを増すようにデザインされていました。モバイルOSのWindows CEはあくまでもパソコンのアクセサリーであって、パソコンとWindowsに変わるデバイスではありませんでした。そしてWindows TabletはWindowsに変わる低価格製品ではなく、付加価値をつけたより高級な製品でした。

このようにMicrosoftの失敗の原因は、かなりの部分、ソフトウェアに価値の中心をおき、ハードウェアをコモディティーとして扱うビジネスモデルに由来します。

それでMicrosoftは立て直せるのか？

さて問題は、Microsoftを脅かしている現在進行形の破壊的イノベーションはどこまで進むかです。そしてTabletの北米の売り上げが鈍化しつつあるというデータを見ると、Tabletに関しては思ったほど早くは進まない気がします。またスマートフォンの売り上げの伸びに比べて、Androidスマートフォンの利用のされ方が限定的で、フィーチャーフォンの代わりに利用されているだけということも多いようです。騒がれているほどにはMicrosoftは窮地に立たされていない印象です。

MicrosoftにとってAndroid Tabletが普及してPCを代替するのが一番の脅威です。しかしAndroid Tabletは売れているものの、利用は余りされていないというデータが多数あります。特に企業には浸透していません。

今後のMicrosoftにしても、ヒステリックな方向転換をしない限り、継続してWindowsとOfficeを中心においた戦略を立ててくるでしょう。しかし世の中は完全にMobileに目が向いていますので、WindowsとOfficeの利益を確保することではなく、WindowsとOfficeの強い立場を利用してMobileを立て直そうとするでしょう。一旦はWindows 8やSurface RTで既存のWindows/Officeと縁を切るような大胆な戦略を試みましたが、これは失敗に終わっています。IntelのCPUも持ち直していますので、Windows/Officeの強みに乗っかった戦略がたてやすくなっているはずです。

破壊的イノベーションが成功するかしないかの最大のポイントは、既存のトップ企業が、まだ間に合ううちに反撃に出るかどうかです。間に合うかどうかというのは、新興の企業･製品が十分に既存製品を代替できるところまで進化しているかどうかにかかっています。つまりスマートフォンとTabletが十分にパソコンを代替できるかどうかです。十分に代替できるところまで来ていれば、Microsoftは反撃のしようが無くなります。しかしそうでなければ反撃が効きます。

Tabletについては、まだまだパソコンを代替できていません。特にAndroidは7インチに偏っていて、娯楽に完全にフォーカスしています。Tablet市場がパソコンを使って仕事をする方向に向かっていません。これではなかなかパソコンは代替しないでしょう。

反撃にいったん出れば、既存のトップ企業はそうそう負けるものではありません。Microsoftの場合、まだ間に合う気がします。