Chinese Android Larger Than Google’s Android

Chinese Android, that is the Android that is based on Android Open-Source (AOSP) and is independent of Google’s services and restrictions, seems to be already significantly larger than Google’s Android (the one that relies on Google services, and comes with Google’s restrictions).

At least that seems to be the case if we look at app download statistics.

According to Analysys International, App downloads in China were 23.4 billion for 2014Q1 alone. In comparison, Google Play downloads were probably in the 15 billion range for 2014Q2 (Estimated from 1 & 2). That’s quite a big difference.

Revenue-wise, I don’t have any data. However, given that Google Play revenue is dependent on mature developed nations (Japan, US, South Korea), it is very possible that revenue is growing much faster in China. Furthermore, iOS App Store revenue has been pretty high in China, suggesting that the Chinese have a rather high propensity to spend money on Apps. I would not be surprised if Chinese Android app revenue is similar to or has already surpassed Google Play app revenue.

Of course this discussion hinges on the “23.4 billion for 2014Q1 alone” report being true. Hopefully, we will get verification soon.

Obviously, the implications of this are huge for the Android ecosystem.

The Law of Conservation of Attractive Profits And Personal Computing

In a previous post, I wrote about my concerns on how the law of conservation of attractive profits might apply to the next stage of mobile computing, especially in emerging nations.

Here, I would like to describe how the law of conservation of attractive profits helps us to understand the history of personal computing. This is particularly instructive because it strongly suggests that this law will continue to be applicable in the future.

The law of conservation of attractive profits

I quoted a brief description of the law of conservation of attractive profits from Clayton Christensen’s book “Seeing What’s Next” in my previous post.

What it tells us is;

  1. When commoditization occurs at a certain stage in the value chain, an adjacent stage will gain the opportunity to earn attractive profits.
  2. Attractive profits emerge at the stage which solves the most difficult problems in the industry, typically with an integrated approach.
  3. This integration may happen at the product component level, customer interaction level or supplier interface level.

Hence to identify which stage will earn attractive profits, we have to understand what the most difficult problem in the industry is. This is not necessarily a technical problem, but can be any stage in the value chain.

Obviously, different countries, different regions may have different problems in their value chains. In particular, the average spending power is very variable between regions and this will necessitate different approaches to the market. Hence different stages will earn the attractive profits, depending on region.

Application to personal computing history

  1. From the late 1970s to early 1980, Apple and IBM were the powers in personal computing. They took components and assembled them into their respective proprietary personal computer platforms. During this age, the attractive profits were in designing the platform and assembling the computer.
  2. As technology improved however, this shifted. Compaq reverse-engineered the IBM-PC, creating a clean room implementation in the 1980s. This effectively commoditized the platform design of the IBM-PC. Assembling a PC suddenly became very easy to do. When this happened, the power in the industry shifted to adjacent stages, namely Microsoft (in software) and Intel (in CPUs).
  3. In the 2000s, the Internet came and created another layer in the value chain. At the same time, innovation in PCs started to falter partially due to the fact that PCs had become “good enough” for office productivity. The absolute processing power that Intel provided through its new CPUs no longer became important because the old ones or the cheaper ones from AMD were “good enough”. Similarly, the new operating systems that Microsoft released no longer became essential because the old ones had “good enough” features. This created an opportunity for the attractive profits to shift towards Internet service companies (which were in their infancy and not yet “good enough”), and bore behemoths like Google.
  4. Apple then came along in 2007, bringing a totally revolutionary product, the iPhone. This caused the whole evolution cycle to go back to the beginning and once again, the company that assembled the final product commanded the most attractive profits (Apple). The most difficult problem in computing was designing and creating smartphones that were small and light, yet powerful. They also had to contend with the dilemma of very limited battery capacity and full-day battery-life expectations. This was the responsibility of the hardware manufacturers.
    Hence similarly in the Android ecosystem, the most profitable company became Samsung, also the company that assembled the device.
  5. As technology progresses and solves the most pressing problems in smartphones, the profits move away from the hardware assemblers to adjacent stages. Hence the predicament that Samsung now finds itself in. At this point however, it is not yet clear which adjacent stages will reap the profits. In particular, it should stress that is no by no means obvious whether Google services will become this stage or not.

Which layer could reap future smartphone profits?

I won’t try to reach a conclusion here, but simply point out a few things that I think are important.

Things to consider;

  1. A huge problem in the smartphone industry is how to expand customers and how to expand usage in various countries and various market segments. It is increasingly apparent that a one-size-fits-all approach is not going to work.
  2. The problems in the industry will significantly differ according to which market segment we are looking at. For example, high-end smartphone users may have issues with sharing links, customizing the user interface, pure Google-ness, continuity with other devices, notifications, maps, etc. On the other hand, low-end users will have issues with ease-of-use and prices. Similarly, price is much more of an issue for users in emerging countries (regardless of tech literacy) than developed countries.
  3. Whereas hardware and low-level software affect the experience of every user, the service layer is more specialized. For example, not everyone uses a complex social networking service like Facebook and may be content with SMS. Similarly, people who often visit unfamiliar places will make constant use of maps, but there are also many people who simply go to-and-fro from the same few locations most of the time. The same thing can be said for Google Now. People don’t need to be constantly reminded of things that they do every day of the week.
  4. Google actually doesn’t control a lot of the services that are suited to people in emerging nations. For example, their most visited property on mobile devices is YouTube. However, YouTube takes up hideous amounts of bandwidth which will be a problem in these countries. Facebook and WhatsApp either don’t have this issue or have worked hard to fix this.
  5. Because emerging countries do not have too many people on credit cards, billing for software and services is a large issue. Carrier billing is seen as a solution for this. Carriers will be able to extract the attractive profits proportionally to the importance of carrier billing in that country.
  6. The layer that can customize the solutions to match the different markets is in a good position to gain the attractive profits. For hardware, this would be the local vendors who can now easily create custom hardware with the help of the Shenzen ecosystem in China. For the software and services, carriers traditionally have been the gateway.

Google and the Law of Conservation of Attractive Profits

In this blog, I have touched on Clayton Christensen’s “law of conservation of attractive profits” a few times (in Japanese: 1, 2)

The law of conservation of attractive profits is briefly described in Christensen’s book “Seeing What’s Next”. Below is a passage from the book;

We have also called the law of conservation of integration the “law of conservation of attractive profits,” because companies make attractive money when they solve the hardest problems. The hardest technical problems mandate solutions that are tightly coupled integrated systems. When modularity and commoditization cause attractive profits to disappear at one stage in the value chain, conservation of integration means the opportunity to earn attractive profits with propriety products will emerge at an adjacent stage.

Conservation of integration explains why it is not accurate to characterize and industry as integrated or disintegrated. There are numerous types of integration in any given industry. Specialists are integrated, just in different ways. Whereas integrated firms might span an entire industry’s value chain, specialist firms might be integrated to produce a single component that itself is not good enough. Or they could be integrated across whatever interfaces drive customization and convenience, which could be the point of customer interaction or the interface with suppliers.

I find that the law of conservation of attractive profits gives us great insight into how personal computing evolved from computers like the Apple II to the iPhone. This is a long topic, and I hope to touch on it sometime in the future.

For the current discussion, I would like to touch on how Google seems to be trying to manipulate the smartphone value chain and whether it will succeed.

To understand the current situation better, I suggest readers listen to two excellent podcasts which describe the different strategies that Apple and Google are pursuing.

  1. Cubed Podcast: “Google I/O Takeaways and Implications”
  2. Tech.pinions Podcast: “Google I/O, 4K, GoPro”

Regarding Google, what is suggested in these podcasts is that Google is trying to commoditize both hardware and software so that their services will reach the widest audience possible, thereby providing Google with data to feed their machine learning project. They do not seem to care about creating an ecosystem in which their hardware OEMs and application developers can sustain profitable businesses.

Viewed from the law of conservation of attractive profits, this can be explained as Google attempting to commoditize hardware and software, so that the service layer will dominate attractive profits.

The question is, will this work?

Listening to Ben Bajarin in the Tech.pinions Podcast, it dawned on me that there is another layer that actually has a bigger chance than Google of gaining the attractive profits. That is the carrier layer.

Carriers have the following advantages;

  1. Carriers are the interface to customers, and importantly, they control the billing, especially in emerging countries.
  2. Carriers own the pipe and can control the flow of content through their networks. For example, they can provide unlimited access to WhatsApp and Facebook, while restricting access to YouTube and other sites.
  3. Carriers are local. This means that they can tailor pricing and promotions to fit the local situation. This is especially important in emerging countries where the spending power of the average citizen is a fraction of that in developed nations.
  4. Before the introduction of the iPhone, carriers had huge power in the ecosystem. So much so that Steve Jobs famously called them “orifices”. It has already been proved that the market structure is such that carriers can command huge profits if the circumstances are right.

Ben Bajarin briefly touched on Cherry Mobile in the Philippines, which is a carrier that is selling its own brand of smartphones.

I am not yet familiar with what Cherry Mobile is actually doing, nor have I spent time thinking about this in more detail. It does appear however, that Google is not the only potential beneficiary from software and hardware commoditization. In fact, it seems totally possible that services will also be commoditized and that the carriers will reap the attractive profits.

This is a theme that I will continue to think and hopefully write about.

Why Google I/O Worries Me

Google I/O 2014 is scheduled to start in a couple of days from today. The event schedule is available here and you can see what sessions are in store. Unlike Apple’s WWDC 2014 event, the session titles are clear and none are secretive like “Shhhh, Can’t Tell You Yet”.

Since I have not looked at previous Google I/O events in detail, I have not idea whether or not the session titles give any indication of Google’s strategy. Having said that, the list of Google I/O sessions seems to have little to do with new Android APIs (or Google Play Service APIs for that matter). What I notice is that there is stuff for web developers, cloud management, wearables and cross development. There are sections devoted to Android, but they seem to be about how to leverage the current APIs, not about new ones.

I am very concerned about this because I am sensing that Android development is being deemphasized within Google. I sense that Google is not interested anymore in expanding the technical horizon of Android smartphones, and is only interested in gaining access to developing nations by making Google smooth on low-powered devices.

The basis of my concern is that Google used the “Jelly Bean” codename for three iterations starting with 4.1 in July 2012 till the introduction of 4.4 in October 2013. More significantly, Android versions have been on 4.* since “Ice Cream Sandwich” in October 2011 till the current “KitKat”. Furthermore, the main improvement in “KitKat” was not new features or new APIs; it was the fact that the new Android OS was designed to run on low-end devices with as low as 512MB of RAM. Even with “Jelly Bean”, the main attraction was “project Butter”; an attempt to make the UI as smooth and responsive as iOS. You can almost say that Google has not added significant new features or design changes to Android since October 2011 (“Ice Cream Sandwich”). A rundown of Android version history is available from Wikipedia so you can verify for yourself whether or not Android has been making large improvements recently.

At first glance, the list of Google I/O sessions seem to confirm my worry that Android is not aggressively moving forward. It seems to me that in the mid-term, Google is more interested in Android as an OS for wearables, not for smartphone. It could well be that Google considers its work on Android to be already “good enough” and therefore Google is reallocating resources to wearables.

We will learn more about this as Google I/O unfolds so it’s rather meaningless to guess Google’s intentions until we at least hear the keynote speech.

I’ll end this article by saying that if Google is indeed deemphasizing the role of Android as a leading (in functionality) platform for smartphones, the profitability of hardware OEMs will look more precarious than ever because high-end devices will lose their appeal and the replacement cycle will lengthen. I’ll also link to a post by Benedict Evans that notes a similar concern on the future stability of the Android platform.

For me, this is by far the most important thing that I want to learn from Google I/O.

As a footnote, keep in mind that iOS 8 has introduced a huge number of APIs and is arguably the largest iOS update ever. Android advocates may comment that iOS 8 is simply copying features that Android has had for years, but that is totally irrelevant. The fact is that iOS 8 is evolving faster than ever and developers are tremendously excited. Whether Android (on smartphones) decides to keep running alongside iOS or rather decides to slow down will have large future consequences.

Thoughts from WWDC 2014

Some of my random thoughts from the WWDC2014 announcements.

Spotlight search moving away from Google

There has been quite a bit of discussion that Apple may be gradually moving away from Google, even on Search. This is evidenced by Spotlight using Bing for searches instead of Google.

I actually take a different view. I am starting to think that Google search has overshot mainstream demands and is actually vulnerable to low-end disruption. What I mean is that for most of the time, when people are doing Google searches, they don’t really require the full power of Google. Instead, what they want to do is to find the meaning of a word from Wikipedia, a location from Maps, something in the news, restaurant information or information about a song or an application. They don’t really need a search engine that knows everything that is on the net, including random blogs. What they need is information from a handful of distinct services.

Google itself acknowledges this. Search for “sushi” on Google and they will give you a map of sushi restaurants nearby and an entry from Wikipedia. Search for “Masahiro Tanaka” and Google will give you an entry from Wikipedia and a link to news searches. Google realizes that people are not looking for random sushi information, no matter how relevant it may be to the “sushi” keyword. Instead the majority of users are using Google as a gateway to Wikipedia, maps and news.

For these users, a search engine that simply listed Wikipedia entries or directly looked up maps would be more convenient than using the full Google search engine.

Hence my position is that Spotlight is less about replacing Google with Bing, and is much more about directly showing Wikipedia entries, etc. Google is facing the possibility of low-end disruption on search.

iCloud Drive

It is becoming increasingly obvious that some elements of the Cloud are starting to be commoditized. iCloud Drive is a prime example of this. We have DropBox, Box, Google Drive, Microsoft One Drive. We even have open-sourced clones like ownDrive. DropBox, which used to be a prime example of how the cloud is becoming so convenient and important, is now almost completely commoditized. It will be very difficult for even DropBox to differentiate itself from the rest.

Windows compatibility

iCloud Drive will be available for Windows but not for Android. This clearly show what Apple thinks of Android. Apple views Windows as a necessary evil. They realize they cannot ignore Windows because it is so dominant in both the consumer and corporate spaces.

On the other hand, Apple considers Android users as people who made the wrong choice by mistake. Apple thinks that if Android users regain their sanity, they will move towards iPhone.

Seriously, if you consider the few most likely multi-OS situations and think through how Apple would like each consumer to behave in the future, you can see the rationale behind Apple’s decision.

For example, Windows PC and iPhone/iPad users are completely covered by Apple’s commitment to iTunes on Windows and iCloud Drive. There is clear multi-device support there, although limited because Apple can not directly modify Windows.

Also, you won’t find many Mac users who decided to use Android smartphones, so it’s meaningless to cater to these users.

There will be many Windows PC users who also have Android phones. Apple isn’t able to target these users with iCloud until they buy at least one Apple device, but that’s another strategy.

Now the main issue is with Windows PC users who own an iPad and an Android phone. Given the market share of each device category, there are quite a lot of users in this segment. Now iPad and Windows will work well together, at least as well as how Windows and Android will work. Given the rapid replacement cycle of smartphones and the dominance of Windows, it makes sense for Apple to try to convert the Android phone to iPhone rather than to convert the Windows PC to a Mac. To achieve this, Apple should work on getting the iPad to work better with Windows, at least better how Android. They should try to make Android the odd-man-out. This isn’t a difficult task given how Google doesn’t like collaborating with Microsoft.

So my view is that Apple is being very sensible in supporting Windows in their multi-device strategy and not supporting Android.

Slow Progress is Killing Firefox OS’s Small Opportunity

About a year ago, I discussed (mostly in Japanese) the possibility that Firefox could succeed if they successfully targeted the opening in the Smartphone market at the low-end.

At that time, Android did not have a solution for low-end smartphones. As a results, vendors were not using the latest OS but using Android 2.3 in the products instead. I stated that if Firefox OS worked smoothly on low-spec devices, it might be able to successfully enter the market.

That hasn’t been what has happened.

Just yesterday, Mozilla announce they are accepting preorders for Firefox Flame, a mid-tier reference Firefox OS device. It has a 1.2 GHz dual-core processor and a 4.5-inch screen. This is not a low-end device. In this market tier, it will be extremely difficult to compete with Androids.

I am pretty disappointed with the progress that Firefox OS has made. In a year, instead of focusing on the low-end, they seem to have moved up-market. Maybe Firefox OS didn’t work well on low-end devices. If so, then it would be an engineering problem.

The way I see it, Firefox OS has lost the ability to compete in the market where it could have been relevant. As Moore’s law progresses, the low-end smartphone market will be filled with higher spec phones which can run the latest version of Android. This will effectively close the small opening that existed temporarily.

Notes on the Capitalist’s Dilemma

Clayton Christensen, the author of “The Innovator’s Dilemma” has been working on the idea that capitalism is having trouble in investing in the types of innovation that really count. Instead investing in those that are actually detrimental to the economy.

Coming from the most influential thinker on innovation, this idea should not be taken lightly. Harvard Business Review has recently published a summary of his work, and it is very much worth reading (the article is divided into many pages, so if that troubles you, I recommend the page optimized for printing.).

I’ll just jot down some things that I consider to be the key points;

  1. “The Capitalist’s Dilemma” is the reason why major economies around the world are experiencing “jobless recoveries” where the economy grows, but jobs are not being created.
  2. Not all innovations are equal. In fact, the majority of the innovations that are happening today are detrimental to economic growth. The authors dissect “Innovation” into three separate categories and argue that the one that create jobs (market-creating innovations) is currently being de-emphasized, while the one that eliminates jobs (efficiency innovations) is being highlighted.
  3. The reason that the wrong category of innovation is being pursued is because the approach to finance that is taught is wrong. Business schools are teaching students to focus on the wrong metrics for evaluating corporate strategy, and as these people end up running banks or businesses, this is hurting the economy.

As the authors’ work illustrates, we have very little understanding of what drives economic growth and the role that innovation plays in it. No wonder we are in this mess.

There’s Still Time Left for Microsoft Tablets

Nine months ago, back when the flattening of iPad sales had not yet become obvious and when the majority of analysts were predicting tablets to soon imminently replace notebooks, I wrote quite a bit about Microsoft (in Japanese).

In summary, I wrote;

破壊的イノベーションが成功するかしないかの最大のポイントは、既存のトップ企業が、まだ間に合ううちに反撃に出るかどうかです。間に合うかどうかというのは、新興の企業・製品が十分に既存製品を代替できるところまで進化しているかどうかにかかっています。つまりスマートフォンとTabletが十分にパソコンを代替できるかどうかです。十分に代替できるところまで来ていれば、Microsoftは反撃のしようが無くなります。しかしそうでなければ反撃が効きます。

The largest factor determining whether a disruption succeeds or not is whether the incumbents respond in time. “In time” is defined by whether the entrant product has evolved to the point where it can fully replace the incumbent. In the context of Microsoft, it is defined by whether the combination of a smartphone and a tablet can replace a PC. If the answer is yes, then Microsoft cannot retaliate. Otherwise, a counterattack will still be effective.

Tabletについては、まだまだパソコンを代替できていません。特にAndroidは7インチに偏っていて、娯楽に完全にフォーカスしています。Tablet市場がパソコンを使って仕事をする方向に向かっていません。これではなかなかパソコンは代替しないでしょう。

Tablet still cannot replace PCs. In particular, Android tablets are skewing towards 7-inches and are focusing on entertainment. The tablet market is not moving towards doing work. Hence, tablets are unlikely to replace PCs.

反撃にいったん出れば、既存のトップ企業はそうそう負けるものではありません。Microsoftの場合、まだ間に合う気がします。

Because of the vast resources they can deploy, incumbents rarely lose once they retaliate in time. In the case of Microsoft, I think they still have time.

Apple has released their sales figures for 1Q2014 and the sales of the iPad have clearly flattened. Although iPad sales volumes (~ 20 million units) are still very impressive, at this level, it does not look like they are on a trajectory to replacing PCs.

So Microsoft still has time.

In fact, the new Surface Pro 3 clearly shows that Microsoft understands this. Instead of launching a hastened response to the iPad which was the original Surface RT, they have launched a product that attacks from their dominant strength in PCs and office productivity software. They have realized that laptops are not going to be replaced by tablets any time soon, and that sales of Windows laptops will continue to surpass the sales of iPad-like productivity tablets. Hence their dominant power, although weakened, will still be a formidable asset for the foreseeable future.

So instead of starting afresh, they are playing their strengths and using their resources wisely. Instead of attacking tablets head on, their plan seems to be to embrace and to internalize tablets into their laptop products.

This clearly makes sense.

Of course, it will take time. But Microsoft has realized that it has time.

Chromebook = Netbook revisited

Almost a year and a half ago, I stated (in Japanese) that it is plainly obvious that Chromebooks will follow the fate of Netbooks.

I outlined how Microsoft would respond if they ever perceived Chromebooks to be a threat.

したがって今回は、もしMicrosoftが反撃を開始するとすれば、Acerなどの低スペックモデルに割安でWindows 8を供給し、そしてSkyDriveの無料使用分を追加する形で反撃することが十分に予想されます。Google Docsの対抗製品であるWindows 365の無料使用分を付ける可能性もあります。

This time, if Microsoft decides to fight back, they would start providing Windows 8 cheaply to low-spec models like the Acer. They would also add free SkyDrive capacity. It is also likely that they would include free Office 365 to compete with Google Docs.

That seems to be exactly what Microsoft has started to do with Windows Bing. Computer makers will start announcing PCs shortly so we should see how these will be priced. I expect prices to be very similar to Chromebook prices.

So far so good.

We can now sit back and wait for the next chapter:
“Interest in Chromebooks wane.”

Update

It is interesting to note that since Microsoft now has a cloud-based subscription revenue model in Office 365, it will be more willing to reduce the cost of Windows. According to this report, Windows 8.1 usually costs $50 per license but Microsoft is offering it for $15 on low-cost devices.

Office 365 Personal is $6.99 per month or $69.99 per year. Add the fact that all these low cost PCs will come with Bing as their default search engine, hence generating ad revenue for Microsoft, and you can see that this strategy makes sense for Microsoft even without a threat from Chromebooks.

Jobs-to-be-done in India

Just happened to read an article on The New York Times with a very interesting quote;

“Micromax is giving India what it wants: more bang for the buck,” Rahul Sharma, its co-founder and chief executive, said in a phone interview. “Most Indians don’t walk into a store asking for a smartphone; they go, “Bhaiyya, isme chat chalega?” (“Brother, will the chat apps work on this phone?”)

I suspect that this is not only relevant to the Indian market, but also key to getting “late-majority” and “laggards” to switch from feature phones to smartphones, even in countries like Japan with its ferocious appetite for high-end iPhones.

This is the ultimate jobs-to-be-done for smartphones. The specs or OS or ecosystems of smartphones don’t really matter.